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I. INTRODUCTION
(jN SEPTEMBER 1, 1983, a Korean Airlines Boeing 747
(Flight KE 007) ("KAL"), en route from Anchorage,
Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea, deviated from its charted course
and passed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula
and Sakhalin Island. Soviet military aircraft shot Flight 007
down and all 269 persons died as KAL sank into the Sea of Ja-
pan, southwest of Sakhalin Island. The victims consisted of 29
flight crew members and 240 passengers. The passengers were
from the following countries: Korea (76), United States (62),
Japan (28), Taiwan (23), Philippines (16), Hong Kong (12),
Canada (8), Thailand (5), Australia (2), United Kingdom (2),
* Professor of Law Faculty, Matsuyama University; Honorary Professor of
Ehime University; Member of Japan Branch, International Law Association.
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Malaysia (1), India (1), Sweden (1), Dominican Republic (1),
Iran (1), and Vietnam (1). 1
II. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
The acting permanent representative of the United States
sent a letter dated September 1, 1983, to the United Nations,
addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to con-
sider the incident.2 The request was supported by letters from
Korea, Japan, Canada, and Australia.'
All of these events occurred during the cold war, and the
United States and other western countries decided to use this
incident to turn international public opinion against commu-
nism. When the Security Council met on September 2, the Ko-
rean delegation condemned the Soviet military action as a clear
violation of the legal norms and generally accepted standards of
international civil aviation. The delegation also requested that
the Soviet Union take at least five steps, which included the
following:
I Legal articles concerning the incident include the following: Chronique des
Faits Internationaux, 88 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 435 (1984); Ger-
ald F. FitzGerald, The Use of Force against Civil Aircraft: The Aftermath of the KAL
Flight 007 Incident, ANNUAIRE CANADIEN DE DROIT INT'L 291 (1984); Gilbert Guil-
laume, La destruction, le ler septembre 1983, de l'avion des Korean Airlines (vol KE 007),
151 REVUE FRANCAIS DE DROrT APRIEN 215 (1984); Farooq Hassan, A Legal Analysis
of the Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union, 49 J. AIR L. & COM.
555 (1984); Peter Martin, Destruction of Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 over Sea of Ja-
pan, 31 August 1983, 9 AIR LAW 138 (1984); Michael Milde, Interception of Civil
Aircraft vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation (Background of Amendment 27 to Annex 2), 11
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 105 (1986) [hereinafter Milde, Interception of Civil Air-
craft]; Michael Milde, KE 007-'Final' Truth and Consequences, 42 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
LUFr-UND WELTRAUMRECHT 357 (1993) [hereinafter Milde, 'Final' Truth]; Jean
Claude Piris, L'interdiction du Recours ti la Force Contre les Aeronefs Civils:
L'amendment de 1984 d la Convention de Chicago, 30 ANNUAIRE FRANC.AIS DE DROIT
INT'L 711 (1984) [hereinafter Piris, L'interdiction du Recours d la Force Contre les
A~ronefs Civils]; Jean Claude Piris, De Quelques Controverses Juridiques Consicutives d
la Destruction du Boeing 747 de la KAL le icr Septembre 1983, 90 REVUE GENERALE DE
DRorr INT'L PuBtLC 815 (1986) [hereinafter Piris, De Quelques ControversesJuridi-
ques Consecutives d la Destruction du Boeing 747]; Ghislaine Richard, KAL 007: The
Legal Fallout, 9 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 147 (1984);Jacqueline de la Roch~re,
L'affaire de L'accident du Boeing 747 de Korean Airlines, 29 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INT'L 749 (1983); Note, Legal Argumentation in International Crises: The
Downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1198 (1984).
2 United Nations Security Council Consideration, 22 I.L.M. 1109, 1110 (1983).
3 Id. at 1111-13.
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(1) [provide] a full and detailed account of exactly what
happened;
(2) [provide] a full apology and complete compensation;
(3) punish all those who were directly responsible;
(4) guarantee unimpeded access to the crash site; and
(5) [guarantee] against the recurrence of such violent
actions.4
Objecting to those claims, the U.S.S.R. delegate cited the So-
viet news agency, Tass, and said:
The intruder plane had deviated from the existing international
route in the direction of the Soviet Union's territory by up to 500
kilometers and spent more than two hours over the Kamchatka
Peninsula, the area of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Island of Sa-
khalin .... Over the Sakhalin Island, a Soviet aircraft fired warn-
ing shots with tracer shells along the flying route of the plane
.... It is appropriate to recall that instances of deliberate viola-
tion of the State frontiers of the Soviet Union by American
planes, including in the Far East, are far from rare .... It was
obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims
without hinderance using civilian planes as a cover.5
On September 6, in the Security Council, the American dele-
gate dramatically explained the outline of the incident by using
transmission tapes between the Soviet interceptor and the
ground controllers, which were furnished in cooperation with
the government of Japan.6 The recording stated:
"I'm flying behind."
"The target is 80 degrees to my left."
"The ANO [air navigation lights] are burning. The [strobe]
light is flashing."
"I have executed the launch."
"The target is destroyed."7
Afterward, the fifteen state delegations entered into a heated
discussion on the subject.8
4 Id. at 1114.
5 Id. at 1115-16.
6 Id. at 1121-25.
7 Id. at 1122 n.a4.
8 Id. at 1125-36.
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On September 12, a draft of a resolution of the Security
Council, co-sponsored by seventeen states, declared "that such
use of armed force against international civil aviation is incom-
patible with the norms governing international behaviour" and
elementary considerations of humanity.' But the resolution was
rejected by a veto of the U.S.S.R."
III. ICAO-THE INTERIM REPORT (1983-84)
The ICAO Council held an extraordinary session on Septem-
ber 15-16, 1983, and adopted two resolutions. The first resolu-
tion deplored "the destruction of an aircraft in commercial
international service resulting in the loss of 269 innocent
lives." It recognized "that such use of armed force against in-
ternational civil aviation is incompatible with the norms gov-
erning international behaviour and elementary considerations
of humanity and with the rules, Standards and Recommended
Practices enshrined in the Chicago Convention and its Annexes
and invokes generally recognized legal consequences."' 2 It went
on to reaffirm "the principle that States, when intercepting civil
aircraft, should not use weapons against them." 3 And the reso-
lution directed "the [ICAO] Secretary General to institute an
investigation to determine the facts and technical aspects relat-
ing to the flight and destruction of the aircraft" and urged "all
parties to co-operate fully in the investigation.""' It further di-
rected "the Secretary General to urgently report to the Council
on the status of adherence to, and implementation of, the provi-
sions of the Chicago Convention, its annexes and other related
documents as they bear upon this incident."' 5 This resolution
was adopted by a vote of twenty-six in favor to two against
(Czechoslovakia and U.S.S.R.), with three abstentions (Algeria,
China, and India). 6
In the second resolution, the Council decided "to instruct the
Air Navigation Commission (ANC) to undertake without delay
"a number of technical tasks relating to the implementation of
q: Id. at 1138.
lo Id. at 1138-48.
11 International Civil Aviation Organization Consideration, 22 I.L.M. 1149, 1150





16 Id. at 1150.
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all provisions contained in the annexes of the Chicago Conven-
tion. 17 This resolution was adopted by a vote of six in favor to
four against, with seventeen abstentions.18 At its twenty-fourth
session, from September 20 to October 10, 1983, the ICAO As-
sembly endorsed these decisions of the Council (sixty-five in
favor to ten against, with twenty-six abstentions).19
The investigation team, instituted under the authority of the
ICAO Secretary General, consisted of five staff members who vis-
ited the interested states to uncover information concerning the
incident. But the Soviet government refused to accept a visit by
the investigation team 2° and sent only insufficient information
conducted by the government's own investigation. 2' The data
that the United States government brought forward was also
unsatisfactory.
On December 13, 1983, the report of the investigation (the
"Lambert Report")22 was presented to the Council, and was re-
ferred to the ANC for technical study. The ANC thoroughly ex-
amined the contents of the Lambert Report from January 24 to
February 16, 1984, noting the following comments about the
report:
[T]he [ANC] has not attempted to offer any firm conclusions
regarding the various aspects of the incident because the infor-
mation presented to the Commission in relation to the total pe-
riod of flight KE007 was incomplete and some of the information
received by ICAO had differences which could not be cleared up.
Furthermore, the Commission found it difficult to validate and
endorse the conclusions connected with the scenarios postulated
in the Secretary General's report because any one of them con-
tained some points which could not be explained satisfactorily.
2
The resolution adopted by the Council on March 6, 1984, rec-
ognized the following: First, it noted that "no evidence was
found to indicate that [KAL's] deviation [from its flight plan]
was premeditated or that the crew was at any time aware of the
17 Id. at 1152.
18 Id.
19 FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 293.
20 Milde, 'Final' Truth, supra note 1, at 359.
21 See International Civil Aviation Organization: Action with Regard to the Downing
of the Korean Air Lines Aircraft, 23 I.L.M. 864, 910-21 (1984) [hereinafter Downing
of the Korean Air Lines Aircraft]. A summary of this information is found in Martin,
supra note 1, at 141ff.
22 Lambert is the Secretary General of ICAO.
25 Downing of the Korean Air Lines Aircraft, supra note 21, at 934-35.
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flight's deviation."2 Second, it condemned "the use of armed
force which resulted in the destruction of the Korean airliner
and the tragic loss of 269 lives" and deeply deplored "the Soviet
[government's] failure to cooperate [both] in the search and
rescue efforts of other involved States and the Soviet failure to
cooperate with the ICAO investigation of the incident. 25
The Lambert Report 26 ultimately discarded several possibili-
ties for KAL's flight route deviation "as being too unlikely to




(3) deliberate crew action associated with fuel savings incen-
tives; and
(4) extensive cockpit avionics/navigation system failures or
malfunctions.28
The Lambert Report "did not further consider the hypothesis
entertained by the U.S.S.R. Accident Investigation Commission
that there was a deliberate delay in [KAL's] departure from
Anchorage and a premeditated deviation from the flight plan
route for intelligence gathering purposes. "29
Concerning the cause of the deviation from the planned
route by some 500 kilometers, the Lambert Report presented
two theories regarding the lack of the Digital Flight Data Re-
corder (DFDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). The
first is the "Heading Mode" theory."'
The track from Anchorage VOR to Cairn Mountain NDB is 246
degrees. It was assumed that a heading of 246 degrees could
have been selected to take the aircraft towards Bethel before the
aircraft had reached the minimum reception altitude, and that
the autopilot mode selector was inadvertently left in heading
mode for the flight's duration. The subsequent flight path
would then have been subject to the upper winds, and the iner-
tial navigation system would have indicated waypoint passage at
approximately the estimated times despite being displaced from
the assigned track. [A] magnetic heading of 246 degrees from a
24 Jd. at 937.
25 Id.
2 6 Id. at 865-923.






position after... take-off near Anchorage produced a track that
passed closer to Bethel than was the case with the actual flight. A
simulated flight reached the area ... south of Sakhalin Island, at
a time close to that of the actual flight, though 80 to 100 NM
south. 1
The second theory is the "Mis-input 10" theory.32 "If in the
initial insertion of the co-ordinates for the present (ramp) posi-
tion, a 10 degree error in longitude consisting of an incorrect
W139 degrees instead of W149 degrees had been made, the er-
ror would have been accepted by the INS [Inertial Navigation
System] . This error "would have produced a track to the area
of [KAL's] destruction that was also consistent with the radar
track information provided by the U.S.S.R. and by Japan."' 4
The Lambert Report details the simulations introduced by the
above theories, but in conclusion, the report stated that "[e] ach
of those postulations assumed a considerable degree of lack of
alertness and attentiveness on the part of the entire flight crew
but not to a degree that was unknown in international civil avia-
tion.13 5 Concerning the interception and the shooting-down by
the Soviet military aircraft, the Lambert Report mentioned the
following:
(1) U.S.S.R. authorities assumed that [KAL] was an intelli-
gence aircraft and, therefore, did not make exhaustive efforts to
identify the aircraft through in-flight visual observation;
(2) ICAO was not provided any radar recordings, recorded
communications, or transcripts associated with the [intercep-
tion]; therefore, it was not possible to fully assess the comprehen-
sive nature of the application of intercept procedures, signalling,
and communications;
(3) No evidence indicated that the flight crew of [KAL] was, at
any time, aware of the flight's deviation from its planned route,
[of the interception by the Soviet military aircraft, and] of the
reason for a rapid decompression. 6
IV. ICAO-THE FINAL REPORT (1992-93)
In less than a decade, the political atmosphere in the world
had changed drastically. In December 1991, the Soviet Union
31 Id. at 902.
32 See id. at 868.
33 Id. at 903.
34 Id. at 909.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 869, 909.
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was divested into fifteen states, with its diplomatic relation suc-
ceeding to the Russian Federation. Later in 1992, "a meeting
between the Korean, [American], Japanese and Russian authori-
ties was convened in Moscow." 7 During this meeting, the par-
ties agreed to request that the ICAO complete its 1983-84
investigation and to give full support and to make available all
documentation to the ICAO.
On December 18, 1992, the 137th Session of the Council de-
cided to complete the fact-finding investigation, while the
"black box," the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and digital flight
data recorder (DFDR) tapes, were handed over to the Korean
Government by President Yeltsin on October 1992 and to the
ICAO in Paris by the Russian government in January 1993.4o
But afterward, it was revealed that the real "crown jewels" were
not given.41
An investigation team was formed, comprised of four staff
members and two consultants. Beginning in January 1993, the
team searched for new materials by visiting the United States,
Korea, Japan, and Russia. The team also met the divers who
were involved in the search and retrieval of the flight recorders.
Based on the activities of the ICAO investigation team, the
Report of the Completion of the ICA O Fact-Finding Investigation-Ap-
pendix42 was published in June 1993. This 1993 Report's composi-
tion followed the 1983 Interim Report. The 1993 Report did not
contain information that was more important than the 1983 In-
terim Report in spite of many citations of the newly gained data
from DFDR and CVR." Therefore, the 1993 Report could not
lead to a decisive conclusion about the origin of the incident.
Also, it is noteworthy that the 1993 Report repeatedly emphasized
its finality.
37 Milde, 'Final' Truth, supra note 1, at 363.
38 Id.
3) ICAO Council Working Paper, C-WP/9781, Report of the Completion of the Fact-
Finding Investigation Regarding the Shooting Down of Korean Airlines Boeing 747 (,Hight
KE 007) on 31 August 1983 (May 5, 1993) [hereinafter 1983 Interim Report] (on
file with the JoUrnal of Air Law and Commerce).
40 ICAO Council Working Paper, C-WP/9781, Destruction of Korean Air Lines
Boeing 747 on 31 August 1983-Report of the Completion of the ICAO Fact-Finding In-
vestigation (June 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Report] (on file with the Journal of Air
Law and Commerce).
41 Milde, 'Final' Truth, supra note 1, at 362-63.
42 This appendix is part of the 1993 Report, supra note 40.
43 The 1993 Report notes, "This report complements the report of the ICAO
fact-finding investigation in 1983." Id.
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Concerning the deviation from the planned route, the 1993
Report supported the first of the two theories listed in the 1983
Interim Report-the "Heading Mode" theory. The "conclusions"
of the report are as follows:
3.7 KE 007 turned to a magnetic heading of about 245 degrees
which it reached three minutes after lift-off and then maintained
until the attack.44
3.9 The maintenance of a constant magnetic heading and the
resulting track deviation were due to the crew's failure to note
that the autopilot had either been left in heading mode or had
been switched to INS when the aircraft was beyond the range
(7.5NM) for the INS to capture the desired track.45
3.10 The maintenance of a constant magnetic heading was not
due to any aircraft system malfunction.46
3.15 The failure to detect the aircraft's deviation from its as-
signed track for over five hours indicated a lack of situational
awareness and flight deck coordination on the part of the crew.4 7
3.21 There were no indications that the crew of KE 007 deliber-
ately maintained a constant magnetic heading.48
3.23 The proximity of an RC-135 (a United States intelligence
aircraft) and KE 007 northeast of Kamchatka Peninsula resulted
in confusion and the assumption by U.S.S.R. that the aircraft pro-
ceeding towards U.S.S.R. was an RC-135.49
3.24 U.S.S.R. military aircraft attempted to intercept KE 007 over
Kamchatka Peninsula. °
3.27 The time factor became paramount in the U.S.S.R. com-
mand centers as the intruder aircraft was about to coast out from
Sakhalin Island.51
3.28 Exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not
made, although apparently some doubt remained regarding its
identity.5
2
3.33 The military radar installations of the Japanese Defense
Agency were aware that an aircraft was tracking into U.S.S.R. air-
space over Sakhalin Island. According to the representatives of
Japan, they were not aware that it was a civil aircraft off its in-
tended track.53
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In addition to the 1993 Report, Information Paper No. 15 and a
revised Information Paper, from the Russian Federation,55 were
published. Information Paper No. 1 contained the CVR transcript,
the radio communications recorded in Anchorage and Tokyo,
and the transcript of communications of the U.S.S.R. Air De-
fense Command Centers on Sakhalin Island.56 Note, however,
that since all of these materials involved military secrets of the
interested states, their reliability remained uncertain. With that
word of caution, it is interesting to note the most important con-
versations contained in the materials:
Time From Transmission
17h55m CC 57  First, send 121 and 80558
(G.M.T.) to intercept
target 60-65.
If the border is violated, destroy the
target. 5 9
18h8m CC How many jet trails are there, if
there are four jet trails, then it's an
RC-135.6 o
18hlOm CC 805, can you determine the type?
805 Unclear.61
805 (interference) It is flying with
flashing lights.
62
805 The target is not responding to the
call (IFF). 63
18h15m CC [M]ay (be) a passenger (aircraft).
All necessary steps must be taken to
identify it. 6
4
18h17m CC 805, the target has violated the State
border, destroy the target!6
5
54 Information Paper No. 1, from Secretary General to the Representatives on
the ICAO Council (July 6, 1993) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce).
55 Information Paper No. 2, from the Secretary General to the Representatives
on the ICAO Council Uune 14, 1993) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and
Commerce).
56 The Soviet transcript is available in English.
57 "CC" is the abbreviation of "Command Centre."
58 121 and 805 are Su-15 fighters from Sokol.
59 Information Paper No. 1, supra note 54, at 83.
6) Id. at 122.
61 Id. at 61.
62 Id. at 62.
63 Id. at 63.
- Id. at 86.

















805 The air navigation light is on, the
flashing light is on.66
CC Fire a warning burst with cannons
and rock wings to show the
direction to Sokol.67
805 The target is destroyed.68




(2) Attention emergency descent.
(2) Put out your cigarette. This is an
emergency descent.
Put the mask over your nose and
mouth and adjust the head hand.
All compression.
Rapid compressions descend to one
zero thousand.
Put the mask over your nose and
mouth and adjust ....
After some eleven minutes, the following was transmitted:
18h38m from CC They lost the target, Comrade
Colonel, in the area of Moneron.
70
The "heading mode" hypothesis that the report supported is
not fully persuasive. On this point, I will express some
speculations later in this Article. Whatever it may be, it is an
undeniable fact that one of the major factors causing the
deviation was the carelessness or negligence of the crew of the
Korean aircraft which the report stated repeatedly. Also, the use
of force by the Soviet military aircraft against KAL without
identifying or even warning the intruding aircraft is an abuse of
the right of self-defense. 7' Furthermore, the presence of an RC-
66 Id. at 67.
67 Id. at 128.
68 Id. at 72.
69 Id. at 3-16. Note that "(1)" indicates channel 1 (First Officer); "(2)"
indicates channel 2 (third crew member and PA); "(3)" indicates channel 3
(cockpit area microphone).
70 Id. at 90.
71 Margaret Shapiro, Russians Blame KAL Downing on Airliner's Pilots, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 31, 1993, at A12. Years after the incident, the events were reported as
follows:
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135, an American intelligence aircraft, caused the U.S.S.R. Air
Command to mistake KAL as the spy aircraft.
The three states specified above are the interested parties in
this incident. In the political and military atmosphere at the
time of this occurrence-nearing the end of the Cold War-
these three states, wanting to avoid mutual fault, and building
upon the new peaceful relation among them, hurried in
drawing up the final report. In other words, political
compromise based on the national interests of these states led to
an end of this tragedy without clearing the truth of the incident.
V. SOME SPECULATIONS
As mentioned above, the cause of the deviation from the as-
signed route by KAL was not completely clear, and the situations
under which the Soviet military aircraft intercepted and at-
tacked KAL were not explained in detail. Some speculation re-
garding these questions was presented by Japanese writers, such
as Kunio Yanagida and Ichiro Naito. The former published
three books: two versions of Gekitsui-Daikankohkuhki fiken72
and Black Box-Tsuiseki, Daikankohkuhkifiken.73 Ichiro Naito re-
vealed the report Sakhalin Daikankohkuhki Gekitsui fiko74 in his
book Shinsetsu-Nippon Kohkuhki fikobo.75
Yanagida named the cause of the deviation the "Mis-NAV
change," or the "Mis-operation of INS" theory. He said that the
INS that is now used in the aircraft takes more than fifteen min-
utes for self-controlling (erecting) the fixed and constant bear-
The downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was caused by "a series
of . . . blunders and mistakes" by the jumbo jet's pilots and the
former Soviet Union "bears no guilt," the first Russian commission
to investigate the tragedy said today .... The Russian commission
was set up a year ago by Yeltsin after a visit to Seoul. At the time,
Yeltsin called the KAL tragedy "the criminal act of a criminal
regime."
Id.
72 This book, translated as SHOOTING DOwN-THE KOREAN AIRLINES INCIDENT,
was published twice in 1984.
73 This book, translated as BLACK Box-PURSUIT, THE KOREAN AIRLINES INCI-
DENT, was published in 1985.
74 The report is translated as The Accident of Shooting Down of the Korean Airlines
in Sakhalin.
75 This book, translated as TI-E TRUE THEORy-A LIST OF THE AIRCRAFT INCI-
DENTS RELATING TO JAPAN, contains the report at page 163.
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ing of the rotation axis. 76 The order of operation in the INS
before the start of the aircraft is as follows: 77
(1) switching the mode select on stand-by (STBY), input the
latitude and the longitude of the airport spot, Anchorage 2N.78
(2) changing the switch to Alignment (Align), input each
waypoint of the air-route to go, one by one.79
(3) confirming that the lamp "Ready Nav" changes the green
color, turn the switch to Navigation (NAV).80
For these operations, it takes more than fifteen minutes.8'
On the day of the incident, the crew entered the cockpit later
than the appointed time. For that reason, it was presumed that
the tracking of the body of the aircraft began before the input
in INS was finished, causing the direction of INS to incorrectly
change. As a result, KAL inadvertently kept the flight on the
mistaken course until it trespassed into U.S.S.R. airspace over
Sakhalin. 2 Naito said the probability of this occurring was
ninety-five percent.8 3 Naito vividly explained the situation
under which KAL was shot down. 4
On September 1, at 5:00 p.m., KAL trespassed into U.S.S.R.
airspace over Kamchatka Peninsula, and to intercept it, four
U.S.S.R. military aircraft (Su-15) scrambled. But they went back
to their airbase, failing to find KAL. Then, KAL, flying over the
Sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin Island, communicated twice with
the Tokyo Working NF for North Pacific (channel 3) 17h08m-
09m and 18h14m-27m.a5 At this time, three U.S.S.R. fighters,
two Su-15s and one MiG-23 scrambled. From about 17h56m, all
details of the conversations by the U.S.S.R. fighters were caught
in the radar-sight of the Japanese Air Defense Force at Wak-
kanai,6 and the voices of all fighter pilots were identified. 7 By
this means, it became clear that three of four fighters went back







82 KUNIO YANAGIDA, BLACK Box-TslsEKi, DAIKANKOHKUKI JIKEN 289-94, 352-
56; ICHIRO NAITO, SAKHALIN DAiKANKOHKUNKi GEKITSUI JIKO 191-266.
83 NAITO, supra note 82, at 180-84.
84 Id. at 167-80, 184-86.
85 Information Paper No. 1, supra note 54, at 36-39.
86 YANAGIDA, supra note 82, at 41-49.
87 NAITO, supra note 82, at 168-73.
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23 fighter found KAL and attacked without identifying it as mili-
tary or civil. Two shots of air-to-air missiles failed, but twenty
percent of the almost 300 shots of 23mm-cannons hit KAL. In
about twelve minutes, enlargement of small tears caused by the
hit and failure of the engines caused the aircraft to plunge into
the sea. The cockpit recorded the voice "rapid (de)-compres-
sion" in one minute eight seconds after the attack, and the drifts
on the coast of Hokkaido-Nemuro were small. These facts show
that KAL was not substantially damaged by the missile, as the
ICAO reports stated, but was shot down by cannons of small
caliber."8
VI. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (JULY 29, 1985)
In order to prevent the recurrence of an aerial incident simi-
lar to KAL, in 1985, delegations from Japan, the United States,
and the U.S.S.R. discussed enhancing the safety of flights in the
northern part of the Pacific Ocean three times." On July 29,
1985, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Air
Traffic Control.9 ° For the purpose of assisting civil aircraft in an
emergency situation the parties agreed that "Anchorage and To-
kyo ACCs would initiate communication with Khabarovsk ACC
to provide all available information regarding aircraft assigned
to a NOPAC [North Pacific] route;' 91 "[a] new, dedicated direct
speech circuit would be established between Tokyo and Khaba-
rovsk ACCs, using the currently-existing telephone cable .... "92
and "a study would be conducted regarding the possibility of
using the radio broadcasting station in Petropavlovsk-Kamchat-
skii as a nondirectional radio beacon. ' 3
This memorandum became effective on October 8, 1985,
upon a trilateral exchange of diplomatic notes.94 The agree-
ment among air traffic control centers at Tokyo, Anchorage,
and Khabarovsk regarding the procedures necessary to imple-
ment the terms of this memorandum was signed on November
88 Id. at 167-68, 184-85.
89 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Air Traffic Control, July 29,
1985, 25 I.L.M. 74 (1986).
- Id. at 74-77.
"I Id. at 75.
92 Id. at 76.
93 Id. at 76-77.
94 Id. at 74.
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19, 1985. 95 The agreement became effective on January 28,
1986.96
VII. THE AMENDMENT OF THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION
A. ARTICLE 3 Bis
On September 15-16, 1983, the extraordinary session of the
ICAO Council adopted two resolutions: Appendix A and Ap-
pendix B. In Appendix A, the Council directed the Air Naviga-
tion Commission (ANC) "to review the provisions of the
Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other related documents
and consider possible amendments to prevent a recurrence of
such a tragic incident."97 In Appendix B, the Council, "con-
vinced of the need to improve the existing international rules or
to adopt new rules aimed at ensuring the safety of civil aircraft,"
decided "to instruct the [ANC] to . . . review all the provisions
contained in Attachment A to Annex 2 to the Chicago Conven-
tion concerning interception of civil aircraft."98
The initial proposal for amending the Chicago Convention,
made by the French delegation, was expanded by an Austrian
proposal made to the ICAO Assembly at its twenty-fourth session
from September to October of 1983. These two countries then
prepared ajoint proposal and presented it to the ICAO Council.
In addition, the proposals were made by the United States,
U.S.S.R., Ecuador, and Korea.99
The subject matter of the France-Austrian joint proposal
which was made during the Executive Committee discussion was
divided into three paragraphs:
(a) to define the obligation of non-use of armed force;
(b) to define the right to enforce the landing of civil aircraft
trespassing in its territory; and
(c) to make the necessary rules to ensure the landing of its
own civil aircraft on foreign territory by the order of a foreign
authority.10
95 Id. at 77.
96 Id.
97 ICAO Consideration, supra note 11, at 1151.
98 Id. at 1152.
- FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 297; Piris, L interdiction du Recours d la Force Contre
les Agronefs Civils, supra note 1, at 728-30.
100 The progress of consideration in the twenty-fifth session is in 9 ANNALS OF
AIR & SPACE L. 454-67 (1984); FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 297-306; Pinis,
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The joint proposal provided that each contracting country
must refrain from resorting to the use of force against civil air-
craft, and in the case of interception, the safety of aircraft and
the lives of persons on board should not be endangered. 10 1 The
United States' proposal was similar.10 2 The main aim of the
Western countries was to mandate that the obligation of non-use
of force is the established principle of international law. To en-
act the proposal, countries such as the United States and the
U.K. gave in to the demands of U.S.S.R. and Jamaica in the sec-
ond and third paragraphs.
On the other hand, the Soviet proposal emphasized the abso-
luteness of the national sovereignty on airspace and importance
of national security by providing:
[E]ach contracting State ... undertakes to ensure that such air-
craft shall not violate the sovereignty of other States over the air-
space above their territory and shall not be used for any purpose
inconsistent with the aims of this Convention .... [E]very con-
tracting State in whose airspace a civil intruder aircraft is present
shall refrain from using weapons against such aircraft.10 3
But the Soviet proposals were criticized by Western countries be-
cause the proposals may have justified the shooting-down of
other aircraft like that in the KAL incident.
After the language of the proposals were discussed more
closely, "should not," "shall not," "must not," "abstain," or "for-
bear" were excluded, and "must refrain from" was adopted.10 4
Also, the choice of "weapons" or "force" were adopted.'
The text of paragraph A stated:
The contracting States recognized that every State must refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight
and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on, board
and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This provi-
L 'interdiction du Recours d la Force Contre les Aeronefs Civils, supra note 1, at 718-28;
Richard, supra note 1, at 152-60; and M. MUKAI, MINKANKOHKUHKI ENO BURY-
OKUKOHSHI 47-66 (1993) [English translation is THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST CMvIL
AIRCRAFr].
101 Piris, L interdiction du Recours d la Force Contre les Afronefs Civils, supra note 1,
at 728.
102 Id. at 729.
103 Id.; MUKAi, supra note 100, at 50-53.
104 Piris, L 'interdiction du Recours d la Force Contre les Agronefs Civils, supra note 1,
at 721-23; Piris, De Quelques Controverses Juridiques Consicutives d la Destruction du
Boeing 747, supra note 1, at 824.
105 Piris, De Quelques ControversesJuridiques Consicutives d la Destruction du Boeing
747, supra note 1, at 825.
1064
KOREAN AIRLINES INCIDENT
sion shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights
and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations. 0
6
Paragraph B defined the right of the territorial state to en-
force the trespassing aircraft to land on its territory, in order to
correspond to the obligation of the non-use of weapons in the
first paragraph. Every state agreed that the right was established
in the present international law. Because aerial sovereignty was
stressed in the course of the adjustments between the joint pro-
posal and the proposal of the U.S.S.R., the right to enforce land-
ing was enlarged to include the expulsion of trespassing aircraft
from the territory. 07 The text was as follows:
The contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise
of its sovereignty, is entitled to require the landing at some desig-
nated airport of a civil aircraft flying above its territory without
authority or if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is
being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this
Convention; it may also give such aircraft any other instructions
to put an end to such violations. For this purpose, the con-
tracting States may resort to any appropriate means consistent
with relevant rules of international law, including the relevant
provisions of this Convention, specifically paragraph (a) of this
Article. Each contracting State agrees to publish its regulations
in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.'
Paragraph C provided for the necessary measures to enforce
compliance with an order of the foreign authority. The joint
proposal stated, "Each contracting State agrees to establish all
necessary provisions in its national laws to make it mandatory for
any aircraft .... ,09 On the other hand, the United States'
proposal stated, "Each contracting State shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that aircraft .... "110 The final proposal
provided that "each contracting state shall establish all necessary
provisions in its national laws or regulations." '' The obligation
to make the necessary measures to operate civil aircraft was im-
posed either on the state of the registration or on the state of
106 International Civil Aviation Organization, Amendment of Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation with Regard to Interception of Civil Aircraft, 23 I.L.M. 705, 706
(1984) [herinafter Civil Aviation]; FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 304-05.
107 Piris, L interdiction du Recours d la Force Contre les Aironefs Civils, supra note 1,
at 723-24; Muiai, supra note 100, at 53-54.
108 Civil Aviation, supra note 106, at 706; FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 305.
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the operator. The term "state of operator" was new. In ac-
cepting the proposals of the U.S.S.R. and India, the convention
imposed sanctions against civil aircraft that fail to comply with
the rules of the state of registration or the state of the opera-
tor." 2 The proceedings and possibility of severe penalties
against the violator of an order were modeled after Article 7 of
the Hague Treaty and Article 7 of the Montreal Treaty. The
general understanding was that the content of the severe penal-
ties may be judged individually by each state in conforming with
the purpose of the Treaty. 3
The text stated:
Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in conformity
with paragraph (b) of this Article. To this end each contracting
State shall establish all necessary provisions in its national laws or
regulations to make such compliance mandatory for any civil air-
craft registered in that State or operated by an operator having
his principal place of business or permanent residence in that
State. Each contracting State shall make any violations of such
applicable laws or regulations punishable by severe penalties and
shall submit the case to its competent authorities in accordance
with its laws or regulations.1 14
When the above three paragraphs were accepted, Poland, as a
socialist state, proposed the fourth paragraph as follows: "The
States undertake to take appropriate measures with the aim of
preventing violations by civil aircraft of the air sovereignty of
other States, correcting possible unauthorized deviation of such
aircraft and discouraging the use of civil aviation for illegal pur-
poses inconsistent with the aims of the Convention.""' 5
This paragraph was supported by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern
European states. But the Western states objected that it might
lead the state to shoot down the trespassing aircraft in order to
evade its responsibility.
On May 8, Ghana presented an additional amendment that
"[t]his provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any
way the obligation of all contracting states set out in paragraph
(a), (b) and (c) of this Article."'" 6 The chairman of the commit-
tee persuaded both the Western states, the Soviets, and the East-
112 See id.
113 Piris, De Quelques ControversesJuridiques Consicutives d la Destruction du Boeing
747, supra note 1, at 725; MUKAI, supra note 100, at 54-56.
"14 Civil Aviation, supra note 106, at 706.
115 Id.
116 FitzGerald, supra note 1, at 303-04.
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ern European states to accept it in order to attain a two-third
majority vote for the adoption of this article. 1 7
The text of paragraph D stated:
Each contracting State shall take appropriate measures to pro-
hibit the deliberate use of any civil aircraft registered in that
State or operated by an operator who has his principal place of
business or permanent residence in that State for any purpose
inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision
shall not affect paragraph (a) or derogate from paragraph (b)
and (c) of this Article."'
Article 3 Bis, as an amendment to the Chicago Convention,
was adopted on May 10, 1984, and was sent to the contracting
states for ratification. The number of states chronologically rati-
fied it as follows:1 19










At present, the total number is seventy. The ratifications of 102
states are necessary to place the treaty in effect. This number of
ratifying states indicates the degree of concern the contracting
states have towards the safety of international civil aviation.
B. THE ANNEXES-RULES CONCERN.ING THE INTERCEPTION
On September 16, 1983, the ICAO Council decided to in-
struct the ANC to review the conditions of implementation of
the standards contained in paragraph 2.13 of Annex 11, in para-
graph 3.3.1.1.2.1 (d) of Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention, and
in all the provisions contained in Attachment A to Annex 2 of
the Chicago Convention concerning the interception of civil air-
117 Id. at 304; Piris, De Quelques ControversesJuridiques Consicutives d la Destruction
du Boeing 747, supra note 1, at 725-26; MuKAm, supra note 100, at 56-59.
118 Civil Aviation, supra note 106, at 706.
19 MuKAi, supra note 100, at 113-17.
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craft. 120 These resolutions were expressly endorsed by the
twenty-fourth session of the ICAO Assembly on October 1,
1983. 121
The ANC reviewed the provisions on the subject of identifica-
tion and interception of a civil aircraft for over a year since June
1985, and made the amendments of Annexes 2, 6, 10, 11 and
the many rules of the procedures concerning the interception.
Under the consideration of ANC, the most important question
is whether the concerned states accepted the upgrading of the
special recommendation in attachment A to Annex 2 to the sta-
tus of standards and recommended practice. In this connec-
tion, the great powers such as the United States and the
U.S.S.R., requiring freedom of military aviation, confronted the
majority states that desired the safety of civil aviation. The latter
states agreed with the proposed upgrading, but eight states, in-
cluding the United States and U.S.S.R., disagreed. 122
After a long and contentious debate, the Standards (3.8.1,
3.8.2 and new Appendix B) were adopted as the new rules con-
cerning interception. On the proposal by the United Kingdom,
the wording of Article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention was in-
troduced to paragraph 3.8.1. The proposed Amendment 27 to
Annex 2 was adopted by twenty-two votes in favor, four opposed
(Czechoslovakia, Egypt, United States, and U.S.S.R.), and six ab-
stentions. 123 Since no state registered a disapproval of the
amendment by the date prescribed by the Council, it became
effective on July 27, 1986, and was applicable on November 20,
1986. 124
The principal points in Amendment 27 to Annex 2 are as
follows: 125
In the new Standards, interception of civil aircraft shall be gov-
erned by appropriate regulations and administrative directives is-
sued by the contracting States in compliance with Article 3(d) of
the Chicago Convention under which contracting States under-
take when issuing regulations for their State aircraft to have due
regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft (3.8.1).
120 ICAO Consideration, supra note 11, at 1150-53; Milde, Interception of Civil Air-
craft, supra note 1, at 106-10.
121 ICAO Consideration, supra note 11, at 1149.
122 See Milde, Interception of Civil Aircraft, supra note 1, at 108-20.
123 Id. at 120.
124 Id. at 120-22; MuKA, supra note 100, at 71.
125 MuKAT, supra note 100, at 69-77.
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In the new Appendix B, interception is the last means and is
restricted to the case of identification of the concerned aircraft,
except the case of need to return the concerned aircraft to the
scheduled route, to direct it from outside of the territorial air-
space, to evacuate it from the prohibited, restricted or dangerous
zone, or instruct to land at the designated airport.
In the amended Attachment A, the wording of "non-use of
weapons" was changed to "refrain from the use of the light
(flame) tracer as the optical signal (8.1).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Korean Airlines incident on September 1, 1983, called
our attention to the unlawfulness of the use of force against civil
aircraft, especially in the context of international airline flights.
ICAO published the 1983 Interim Report and the 1993 Final Report
to investigate the cause of deviation from the scheduled route by
KAL and to explain the situation under which the Soviet fighters
shot it down. But the 1993 Report followed the outline of the
1983 Report and could not wholly explain the incident. Never-
theless, many materials such as the DFDR, the CVR and the
others from the U.S.S.R., or Radio Communications-Record
from Japan and the United States, were offered, and quoted, by
the investigation team of ICAO. The speculations of two Japa-
nese writers, Yanagida and Naito, are the most plausible expla-
nations of the incident.
The cause of deviation was due to the failure to fully check
the assigned track on each waypoint for over five hours. It as-
sumed lack of alertness and attentiveness on the part of the
flight crew. The 1983 Report stated that such a default was com-
mon in international civil aviation. But the interception and
shooting-down of KAL by the Soviet fighter, without identifica-
tion and warning, are unlawful and must be criticized severely.
On July 29, 1985, the agreement that provided the arrange-
ment for communication between Japan, the United States, and
the U.S.S.R. concerning civil aviation in the northern Pacific was
signed. It has been useful in preventing international aerial ten-
sions there, in particular since the end of the cold war.
ICAO directed ANC to review the provisions of the Chicago
Convention, its annexes, and other related rules for the safety of
civil aviation. Article 3 Bis of the Convention, signed on May 10,
1984, is not yet in effect. The amendments to annexes and
other rules were effective on November 20, 1986, but these new
rules are unsatisfactory for the prevention of the recurrence of
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aerial incidents. The measures taken following the KAL inci-
dent are insufficient for the safety of civil aviation.
Public interest in the safety of international civil aviation
sometimes conflicts with the individual interest each state has in
its own territory. Nonetheless, despite the reality of interna-
tional politics, we are obliged to seek the safety of international
civil aviation.
